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The coast-interior gap in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has widening, 
but FDI has been diffusing within the two areas. Using data for 28 Chinese provinces from 
1985 to 2007, I examine the determinants of regional distribution of FDI among Chinese 
provinces under the guidance of three theories of FDI location choice: agglomeration 
economies, comparative advantage and location tournaments.  
The regression results provide support for the hypothesis in all three theories. The self-
reinforcing effect of FDI in China can be confirmed and tax incentive is indeed a significant 
determinant for FDI location choice. Among the four proxies for comparative advantages, 
wage and GDP per capita have the expected effects on FDI location choice while the effect of 
infrastructure is statistically insignificant. To my surprise, human capital shows a puzzling 
negative effect on the location choice of FDI. 
I also find differences in the behaviour of two groups of foreign investors in China: 
Hongkong-Macao-Taiwan (HMT) investors and NON-HMT investors. HMT investment 
tends to be highly responsive to tax incentive, whereas NON-HMT investors do not take tax 
incentive as seriously as other determinants. Agglomeration economies are found to be more 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
China is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among all developing 
countries with a total cumulative amount of US$692 billion FDI from 1979 to 20071. FDI has 
been one of the critical engines for rapid economic growth in this country for the last three 
decades. In the modern history of economic development, no other countries have ever 
benefited as much as China has from FDI and hence FDI has always been one of the focal 
points in the literature on the growth of the post-reform Chinese economy. Moreover, FDI 
inflows into China have exhibited unique characteristics which are presented in the following 
sections. 
1.1 Growth of FDI in China 
China’s FDI inflows started in 1979 when a new Law on Joint Ventures was passed, 
providing basic legal framework for foreign firms to operate in China. Under this new law, 
provincial and local governments were allowed considerable freedom in regulating the joint 
ventures established within their jurisdictions. The first four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
were set up in the Southern coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian2, offering preferential 
tax and administrative treatment to foreign firms. These two provinces were chosen because 
of the geographic proximity and close links in terms of dialects and cultures to Hongkong and 
Taiwan.  In addition, foreign investors in SEZs could enjoy an unusually free hand in their 
operations. Through most of the 1980s, incoming FDI grew steadily and made important 
changes to the regional economic development of Guangdong and Fujian. 
                                                    
1
 China Statistics Bureau (CBS) (2007), China Statistics Yearbook 2007, Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
2
 Xiamen in Fujian; Shantou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai in Guangdong. 
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In 1984, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed Shenzhen a successful experiment of SEZs and the 
government granted similar tax exemptions and administrative procedures to 14 additional 
administrative units (mostly municipalities on the coast). The local governments in these 
areas set up Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs) which offer the same 
provisions as the SEZs, and authority at local level could approve FDI projects under US$30 
million (this threshold was later increased to US$50 million). 
A major regulatory change in FDI came in 1986, called “22 Regulations”. Foreign Invested 
Enterprises (FIEs) were made eligible for reduced business income tax rates regardless of 
location and were granted increased managerial autonomy. In addition, foreign investments 
in “export oriented” projects and “technology advanced” projects could be given more special 
benefits. 
The stream of incoming FDI turned into a flood after a string of remarkable speeches Deng 
Xiaoping made during his famous “Southern Tour” in Spring 1992, which endorsed the open-
door policy. Local governments were encouraged to open further to foreign investors and 
eighteen new ETDZs were approved in 1992-1993 alone3. Contracted FDI jumped to US$11 
billion in 1992, more than triple of that in 1990. The rapid growth continued and reached its 
first peak in 1997 with US$45.3 billion of FDI. Another reason for this surprising increase in 
FDI inflows was that China was then in the midst of an unsustainable expansion with rapid 
credit expansion. However, as we can see in Figure 1, there was a huge gap between 
contracted FDI and implemented FDI during this period as the contracts were usually for 
multi-year business plans. It could also be explained by the fact that foreign investors, 
especially Western investors, were unprepared for the cultural clashes and administrative 
                                                    
3
 Barry Naughton, “The Chinese economy: transitions and growth”, MIT Press, 2007. 
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difficulties when they jumped in and only later did they find that the ventures turned out to be 
unprofitable and inefficient4. Figure 1 also shows that the gap between total amount of 
contracted FDI and actual FDI decreased sharply right after 1993, and by the end of 1990s 
the two amounts were almost equal. 
There was a slight decrease in FDI inflows into China from 1997 to 2000. It resulted from 
monetary and fiscal policies of Zhu Rongji to reduce aggregate demand and moderate price 
inflation. Another important reason was the Asian financial crisis, which hit badly investors 
in Asia who were major investors in China. However, the FDI inflows increased steadily 
from 2001 and reached a new peak of over US$70 billion in 2005. This was an immediate 
result from bilateral agreement with the US in 1999 and China’s WTO entry in 20015. 
Another notable reason was the removal of austerity regime after the Asian financial crisis 
and the government sought to use a sizable fiscal stimulus to boost domestic demand. Again, 
we can observe a rapid increasing gap between total amount of contracted and actual FDI 
after 2000. It might take a long time for China to digest a huge total amount of contracted 
FDI of over USD 200 billion in the period 2005-2007 alone. 
                                                    
4
 Branstetter and Lardy (2006), China’s embrace of globalization, NBER Working Paper 12373. 
5
 Walmsley, Hertel and Ianchovichina (2006), “Assessing the Impact of China’s WTO Accession on 
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Figure 1:Total amount of Contracted & Actual FDI in China
 
 
1.2 Sources of FDI in China 
By 2006, there were 274,863 foreign–invested enterprises (FIEs) with a total registered 
capital of US$946 billion6. Decomposing FDI in China according to the sources indicates that 
Hongkong has been the leading FDI source for China. Before 1990, cumulative FDI from 
Hongkong alone accounted for over 60% of the total FDI stock in China. Geographic 
proximity and cultural linkage between China Mainland and Hongkong could be the major 
reason for Hongkong being the largest foreign investor in China. The large scale of round  
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Figure 2: Share of Hongkong FDI stock
 
tripping FDI between China Mainland and Hongkong may also attribute to the exceptionally 
high FDI inflows from Hongkong. Another possibility is that investors from OECD countries 
may use Hongkong as a spring board to enter Chinese market. However, as China gradually 
opened to global economy, the dominance of Hongkong as the leading source of FDI 
decreased remarkably. In the period from 1985 to 1990, FDI from Hongkong accounted for 
60.9% of total FDI stock, but this share dropped sharply to 48.5% in the period from 1991 to 
2000 and 31.9% in the period from 2001 to 2006. The persistent decreasing trend in the share 
of FDI stock from Hongkong over the years in Figure 2 can help us visualise the situation. 
Japan ranks second in terms of FDI stock in China. From 1985 to 2006, Japanese cumulative 
FDI stock was US$57.5 billion, or 8.4% of the total FDI stock for that period. The US ranked 
third with US$55.1 billion, about 7.9% of the total. Direct investment from European 
countries is relatively small compared with that of Japan and the US. German FDI stock in 
China accounted for about 2% of the total. FDI from the UK was roughly at the same level as 
that of Germany, while FDI from France was much smaller, only above 1% of the total stock. 
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One of the distinctive characteristics of FDI in China is that it predominantly came from East 
Asian economies, especially from Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan. In the period from 1985-
2005, Hongkong, Macau, Taiwan and tax havens (most investments from tax havens into 
China originated from Hongkong and Taiwan7) accounted for 60% of total FDI stock in 
China; whereas cumulative investment from the US, EU and Japan was only 25%. This is 
quite notable when we know that the US, EU and Japan accounted for 92% of total 
worldwide FDI stock from 1998-20028. As we can see in Figure 3, in early 1990s the annual 
share of investment from Hongkong and Taiwan, in terms of both projects and realised FDI 
value, accounted for over 70%. Though this share dropped dramatically after years, it still 
stayed at a significant level of nearly 40% by 2007. Therefore, it is worth examining the 
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Figure 3: Annual Share of HK &Taiwan Projects and FDI
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 Barry Naughton, “The Chinese economy: transitions and growth”, MIT Press, 2007. 
8
 Barry Naughton, “The Chinese economy: transitions and growth”, MIT Press, 2007. 
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1.3 Sectoral composition of FDI in China 
Sectoral composition of FDI in China is also different from that of other developing 
countries. On average, 38% of the FDI stock in developing countries was in manufacturing 
sector, while Chinese manufacturing accounted for 62% of foreign registered capital by the 
end of 2002. In 2003-2004, 70% of total FDI into China was in manufacturing. The share in 
service sector in 2003 was 27% and 55% for China and other developing countries 
respectively9. This can be noted as one of the distinctive characteristics of FDI in China. 
 
Several reasons might attribute to this fact. First, comparative advantage in Chinese 
manufacturing has remained strong in comparison with other countries at the same level of 
development. Second, China still maintained restrictions on foreign entry into most important 
service industries. These restrictions must be gradually removed when China has to follow its 
WTO commitments and we may see a greater stream of FDI into service sectors after 2007. 
Lastly, there might be a difference in the methodology for FDI statistics in China10. 
1.4 Regional distribution of FDI in China 
The distribution of FDI within China has always been extremely biased towards the coastal 
areas. In 1985, the share of FDI stock of all coastal provinces accounted for 90% of the total 
FDI stock. Though this share slightly declined to 87% in 1993 and 85% in 1997, it almost 
stayed around this level for the rest of the years and in 2003 the share of FDI stock in coastal 
provinces was 86%. 
                                                    
9





In the early stage, Guangdong was the largest recipient of FDI among Chinese provinces as 
three out of the first four SEZs were located in this province. Guangdong also enjoyed close 
links in terms of geography and language with Hongkong, where most initial FDI into China 
originated. As we can see in Figure 4, Guangdong alone in 1985 accounted for 50% of 
nationwide FDI stock, while the second and the third largest FDI recipients (Beijing and 
Shanghai, respectively) obtained less than 10% each. However, the dominance of Guangdong 
province has been diminishing steadily over the years. The leading province in 2003 was 
Jiangsu with almost 20% of total FDI stock and Guangdong was the second largest with over 
15%. Shanghai, Shandong and Zhejiang each hosted approximately 10% of total FDI stock 
by 2003. Therefore, FDI has been obviously diffusing within the coastal provinces11, 
resulting in much more even distribution. However, most interior provinces still received 
little FDI in comparison with coastal provinces. Among interior provinces, only Hubei, 
Hunan and Jiangxi showed certain progress in attracting FDI. 
I decompose the variance of FDI distribution over 28 provinces into three components: 
within coastal provinces, within interior provinces and between the two groups to check 
whether the patterns we found above have been a consistent trend: 
1
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 In my thesis, coastal provinces in China include Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. All others are interior or inland provinces. 
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where Iij is the amount of FDI province j receives in a given year and i denotes whether the 
province is on the coast or not. The total number of province is N, the number of coastal 
provinces is N1 and the number of interior provinces is N0. A bar denotes the mean of the 
sample. Therefore, (N0/N)V0 represents the share of FDI variation of interior provinces and 
(N1/N)V1 represents the share of FDI variation of coastal provinces. The rest will be the share 
of FDI variation between the two groups. 
Figure 4: Share of FDI stock by regions in China 
































































































































Source: Author’s calculation from China Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
The results shown in Figure 5 indicate that the within-coastal share of total variation in FDI 
has been falling while the within-interior share has been almost the same for the whole 
period. The gap between coastal and interior groups has been increasing and it accounted for 
over 40% of total spatial variation in FDI by 2003. In other words, we can say that FDI has 
becoming more evenly distributed among coastal provinces but the divide between coastal 
and interior group has been widening over the period from 1985 to 2003. Therefore, there 
naturally come two questions: what made FDI only diffuse among coastal provinces and why 
















Source: Author's calculation based on China Statistical Yearbooks
Figure 5: Share of FDI variation
 
 
1.5 Research questions 
From the overview of FDI in China, we can see that FDI in China is characterised by uneven 
distribution between coastal provinces and interior provinces, the dominance of FDI inflows 
from Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan against the investment from all other countries and the 
focus of foreign investors on Chinese manufacturing sector. Therefore, my thesis aims to 
answer the following questions: 
- What are the determinants for FDI location choice in China? And among these 
determinants, which one(s) might be the most influential? 
12 
 
- As investors from Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan play a crucial role in investment climate 
in China; are there any differences in the behaviour of this group of investors against that of 
investors from other countries? 
In order to answer the questions, I firstly investigate the literature of FDI location choice, 
both theoretically and empirically, in chapter two. Then in chapter three I will describe my 
first empirical model for regression using provincial level data in China in 1990s and early 
2000s. Chapter four will present the second model for the same data set with results and 
discussion for policy implications. The last chapter will conclude my thesis. 
13 
 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical studies for FDI location choice 
There are three theories which can explain FDI location choice: agglomeration economies, 
comparative advantage and location tournament. I will in turn present the three theories. 
Marshall (1920) was the earliest work to explain geographical concentration of economic 
activities. Marshall stated three advantages of localized industries: first, a pooled market for 
specialized workers can help employers easily find workers with a special skill they need and 
it is also natural for workers to go to this place to seek for a job; second, subsidiary industries 
can devote themselves each to a small segment of the whole production process, resulting in 
backward and forward linkages; lastly, knowledge spill-over effects help firms learn good 
work from each other and new ideas can be further developed. This theory may explain the 
existence of a tendency of investing in a region with a large number of well-established firms. 
David and Rosenbloom (1990) also indicates the advantages of a pooled labour market. If the 
fortunes of individual firms are not perfectly correlated, the spatial concentration of industry 
will help laid-off workers find new jobs with other firms faster. Increased number of firms in 
one location, therefore, reduce the risk of being unemployed for a long time. As a result, 
workers elsewhere will tend to move into this location for job search and this, in return, 
benefits the firms as well by increasing the supply of specialized labour and reducing the risk 
premium embodied in wage. On the other hand, Markusen (1990) shows that finer divisions 
of labour in intermediate input markets will lower unit costs for final producers and a firm’s 
decision to invest in a region can promote creation of specialized labour, resulting in 
increasing attractiveness of the region to investors. 
14 
 
Krugman (1991b) states the advantages of agglomeration through concentration of the users 
and suppliers of intermediate goods. Such agglomerations help to reduce total transportation 
costs and create large enough demand for highly specialised components. Therefore, more 
assemblers will come and this will encourage new arrivals with additional specialization.  
Fujita (1988) also implies that increased diversity of inputs increases the productivity of final 
goods producers. 
Knowledge spillovers attribute significantly to agglomeration effects, though it is rather hard 
to be quantitatively captured. We predict that useful technical information seems to flow 
between firms in various industries, and foreign-invested firms may share the experience-
based knowledge on how to operate most efficiently in a foreign region. Physical proximity 
may enhance knowledge sharing by making casual communication less costly and more 
frequently. However, as stated earlier, we find it hard to examine the geographical extent of 
these spill-over effects, the degree they spread between and/or within industries and the scope 
they may flow between firms of different nationals. 
The Marshallian agglomeration economies, in summary, suggest that location of FDI is 
subject to a self-reinforcing process in which regions historically that possess a higher level 
of FDI concentration will continue to receive more FDI while those with much lower FDI 
stock level hardly see their share of FDI rising over time. However, it is worth distinguishing 
a type of agglomeration which may not necessarily result in the concentration of FDI if 
foreign-invested firms set up linkages with domestic suppliers or customers, and hence they 
choose to locate near Chinese business partners instead of other foreign firms. 
Another theory for location choice of FDI is comparative advantage. Henderson (1986) states 
that there is a limit to agglomeration benefits, which implies agglomeration effects cannot 
15 
 
escalate forever. Head et al. (1995) also argues that the location will become less attractive 
when firms congregate since competition among them bids up the price of the inputs. 
Therefore, beyond a certain level of concentration, the benefits from FDI agglomeration will 
be less than the opportunity cost generated by comparative advantage in other regions. Over 
agglomeration will lead to energy shortage, rising labour cost, congested infrastructure and 
expensive intermediate inputs, making alternative locations more attractive to foreign 
investors. As a result, FDI inflows will go to regions which offer the lowest operation costs. 
However, it is not that simple for a firm to relocate its production site due to externalities it 
has internalised by being close to others. Henderson (1985) reveals that even when an old site 
becomes inefficient and a more favourable site emerges, firms in inefficient sites may not 
have incentive to move to the new, low-cost site as they have to disconnect the well-
established linkages. In this case, government should encourage firms to relocate by offering 
external benefits through policy adjustments, promotional campaigns and incentive programs. 
This is what David (1984) has termed “location tournament” and it is proved to be more 
effective in cases when foreign investment is perceived as footloose. Rauch (1993) shows 
that developers of industrial parks can discriminate pricing of land over time in order to 
remove first-mover disadvantages which prevents relocation. 
To sum up, FDI location choice is mainly affected by the actual interaction of these three 
forces: agglomeration economies, comparative advantage and location tournaments. While 
the “winning” in a location tournament can be said to be unstable as once the winner halts the 
subsidies, industry location patterns will revert to their predetermined state, it seems unclear 
whether the other two play an equally important role in attracting FDI or not. 
16 
 
2.2 Empirical studies of FDI location choice 
Unlike theoretical studies, empirical studies of FDI location choice are rather numerous. I 
will briefly summarise the findings of several key papers regarding the three forces, i.e. 
agglomeration, comparative advantage and location tournament. 
2.2.1 Empirical studies for agglomeration effects 
Coughlin et al. (1991) applies a conditional logit model of the location decision of foreign 
firms investing in manufacturing sector in the United States from 1981-1983. The authors use 
manufacturing density variable as a proxy for market demand, but they also argue that 
manufacturing density can be served as a proxy for agglomeration economies. Their 
empirical results show that the more dense the manufacturing activity (the higher level of 
agglomeration economies), the more likely is FDI to occur. 
Wheeler and Mody (1992), on the other hand, studies the manufacturing investments by U.S 
multinationals in the 1980s. The authors use degree of industrialization, level of FDI and 
infrastructure quality as agglomeration benefit indices in the econometric test and the results 
suggest that agglomeration economies are indeed the dominant influence on investor 
calculations. 
Head et al. (1995) also use the conditional logit method like Coughlin et al. (1991) to 
estimate a location choice model using data from 751 Japanese manufacturing plants built in 
the U.S in 1980s. Their estimations support the argument that agglomeration externalities 
play an important role in location decisions with an increase of 10% in any of their 
agglomeration measures leading to a chance of 5-7% increase in future selection. Moreover, 
agglomeration effects seem to be much more beneficial than inter-state differences in terms 
17 
 
of natural resources, labour cost and infrastructure quality. The geographic extent of 
manufacturing agglomeration also helps to increase the level of industrial activity in 
neighbouring states. 
Agglomeration effects in FDI location choice in China have been investigated in numerous 
papers. Head and Ries (1996) tries to quantify the role of agglomeration economies which 
lead to a phenomenon of self-reinforcing FDI. Using a sample of 931 foreign ventures 
established from 1984 to 1991 in 54 Chinese cities, their estimation results support the FDI 
agglomeration hypothesis and assert that agglomeration effects considerably magnify the role 
of local incentives. Incentive zone status attracted 30% more foreign investment than 
otherwise and the gains attributable to incentives decline to 13% in the absence of 
agglomeration effects. 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) confirms the phenomenon of self-reinforcing FDI in China found 
earlier in Head and Ries (1996). Applying Chow’s (1967) partial adjustment model to 
estimate the effects of the determinants of FDI in 29 Chinese regions from 1985-1995, Cheng 
and Kwan (2000) finds a strong self-reinforcing effect of FDI on itself. Various other papers 
like Chunlai Chen (1997d) and Wei et al. (1999) also show a strongly significant, positive 
relationship between agglomeration economies and FDI inflows into a region in China. 
2.2.2 Empirical studies for comparative advantage 
Comparative advantages in FDI locations include a wide set of variables: GDP (or GNP) per 
capita, human capital or literacy rate, labour cost or wage rate, infrastructure, exchange rate, 
geopolitical risk and international relationship etc. However, as the theme of my thesis 
focuses on FDI location choice within China, variables that affect FDI inflows for the whole 
18 
 
country like exchange rate or political risk are out of my interest. Instead, I will concentrate 
on the following popular and relevant variables for my study: GDP or GNP per capita12, 
human capital, wage rate and infrastructure. 
* GDP per capita: empirical papers usually use this variable to capture the local market size 
or demand strength. It is widely argued that big market size will attract horizontal FDI firms 
with an aim to serve the local needs. However, as it is noted in Coughlin and Segev (2000), 
determining a firm’s market is really difficult. Furthermore, within a particular market, 
supply is also an important factor, and therefore it is more precise to use demand/supply ratio 
to capture a market’s desirability for a firm’s output. Thus, we should keep in mind that while 
this variable is a rough proxy for market strength, it is not necessary so. 
Empirical studies in various countries present similar results. Studies for the case of the U.S 
in Coughlin et al. (1991), Wheeler and Mody (1992), or for the case of the U.K and France in 
Hill and Munday (1995) find a significantly positive relationship between market size and 
foreign investment. Papers investigating FDI location choice in China such as Broadman and 
Sun (1997), Chunlai Chen (1997d) , Wei et al. (1999), Cheng and Kwan (2000), and 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) all show that larger regional income per capita is associated with 
higher level of FDI. Broadman and Sun (1997) can even point out that one percent increase in 
the market size of the province may lead to almost one percentage point more FDI into the 
region. 
* Human capital: The quality of the skills of the labour force influences foreign investors’ 
location decisions as regions with highly skilled workers would be expected to be more 
                                                    
12
 In the context of my thesis, this variable is provincial GDP per capita. 
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attractive to FDI, all other things equal. This quality is most easily measured by education 
levels. However, the criteria for education levels in various papers are not the same. While 
most papers use the ratio of the number of primary school pupils (or lower secondary school, 
upper secondary school or even college students) to total population as the proxy for human 
capital, Broadman and Sun (1997) and Coughlin and Segev (2000) uses illiteracy and semi-
illiteracy rate. 
The results in Broadman and Sun (1997) and Coughlin and Segev (2000), as expected, 
exhibit a negative, statistically significant relationship between illiteracy rate and regional 
FDI inflows in China. However, when Cheng and Kwan (2000) uses the ratio for three 
different levels of education (primary, secondary and upper secondary) separately and all the 
results for each three are statistically insignificant, though they have expected positive sign. 
* Wage rate: All else equal, lower wage rate will attract foreign firms, especially export-
oriented foreign invested firms which aim to exploit the advantage of cheap labour cost. 
However, we should be aware that low wage rate might be accompanied by lower 
productivity, and thus the effective wage rate is not low. Therefore, it is ideal if the 
productivity is controlled in the regression analysis. 
Past studies of FDI have found rather conflicting results for the effect of wages, likely due to 
some extent to the omission of a productivity variable. For example, using state level data, 
Luger and Shetty (1985), Coughlin et al. (1990 and 1991), and Friedman et al. (1992) found 
wages to be a negative determinant of FDI in the United States as expected. Nevertheless, 
Smith and Florida (1994) found the wage rate to be a positive, statistically significant 
determinant of Japanese automobile-related factories using county level data for the United 
States. But when Woodward (1992) includes a specific productivity measure for wage rates 
20 
 
in his study of the location of Japanese manufacturing start-ups, the finding is negative, 
statistically significant. Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993) did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between wage rates and FDI in the United States. 
Regarding the case of China, Broadman and Sun (1997) finds a positive, statistically 
insignificant relationship between wages and FDI inflows. Broadman and Sun (1997) did not 
explicitly include the measure of worker productivity, but even when Head and Ries (1996) 
has controlled for productivity differences, its result is still insignificant. On contrary, 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) and Chunlai Chen (1997) both find wage rates a negative and 
statistically significant determinant of FDI as expected. Chunlai Chen (1997) uses average 
provincial wage divided by the host province’s overall industrial productivity, while 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) only uses average annual wage in each province in the regression 
model. 
* Infrastructure: It is quite natural for an investor to consider a region’s infrastructure 
development before they decide to invest as good infrastructure helps to increase productivity 
and lower total transportation cost. Infrastructure may cover a variety of dimensions, ranging 
from highways to waterways, or from railroads to telecommunication systems, and even from 
seaports to airports. Many papers just calculate the total length of transportation routes 
(highways and railways) within the province and then normalised by provincial geographical 
size. Some papers include interior waterways in the calculation, and some papers calculate 
each of the three measures separately. Coughlin and Segev (2000), in addition to total length 
of highways in a province divided by its area, takes the number of total staff and workers in 
state-owned units of airway transportation in a province divided by its population. Head and 
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Ries (1996) uses the number of 10,000-ton capacity deep-water berths to capture the 
importance of transportation facilities for exports, together with railroads and airports. 
Using state level data in the United States, Coughlin et al. (1991) finds statistically 
significant, positive relationship between FDI and three separate measures of transportation 
infrastructure. Wheeler and Mody (1992) suggests the overriding importance of infrastructure 
development in developing countries in attracting investment from U.S multinationals. Head 
and Ries (1996) can also report similar results for Chinese cities. Broadman and Sun (1997), 
Chunlai Chen (1997d), Wei et al. (1999), Cheng and Kwan (2000) all produce significantly 
expected results for infrastructure, while Coughlin and Segev (2000) finds that roadway per 
area and staff in air transport industry are statistically insignificant. 
2.2.3 Empirical studies for location tournaments 
As mentioned earlier, “location tournaments” may include policy adjustments, promotional 
campaigns and policy incentives offered by local authorities to attract investment from 
multinational firms. To capture these phenomena, Wheeler and Mody (1992) uses quite a few 
variables representing the openness of an economy: restrictions on imports, export 
requirements, price controls, local content requirements, expropriation risk, currency 
convertibility, profit repatriation controls and limits on foreign ownership/new investment. 
Their findings are rather paradoxical when short-run incentives have limited apparent impact 
on location choice by U.S multinationals. Nevertheless, Coughlin et al. (1991), a study of the 
location decision of foreign firms investing in manufacturing sector in the United States from 
1981 to 1983, finds expected result when it shows strong evidence that higher taxes deterred 




However, variables used in Wheeler and Mody (1992) can hardly be applied when we 
investigate the location choice decisions within the boundary of one country. In the case of 
China, an important instrument the local authorities usually exercise is the establishment of 
special zones where foreign investors can enjoy generous benefits in the forms of lower land 
prices and tax breaks. These zones can have different names, such as Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) or High and New 
Technology Development Zones. Hu (2007) suggests that the technology park initiative and 
policies to attract FDI are strongly complementary policy instruments. Since the amount of 
FDI a region receives can be used as a criterion to evaluate the local government officers’ 
performance, local Chinese authorities compete in the FDI location tournament by providing 
lower tax rates and cheaper land prices, particularly in these economic and technology zones. 
As a result, numerous papers investigating FDI location choice in China consider the roles of 
SEZs and ETDZs as location tournament. For example, Head and Ries (1996) uses dummy 
variable for incentive zones to capture the benefits of tax breaks. Their finding is that the 
incentive effect is strong and non-declining and early recipients of incentive zone status can 
attract up to 30% more investment than they would have in an incentive-free environment. 
Cheng and Kwan (2000) takes SEZs as a single variable while groups all other zones into 
one. They can also find significantly positive coefficients for the two variables as expected. 
2.3. Further contributions in my thesis 
As we can see through literature review, most of the key papers investigating FDI location 
choice in China were published quite some time ago. Since then, no more well-known 
research has been done to update whether there is any change in FDI location choice in 
China. Furthermore, most published papers used rather simple ways to capture the fact that 
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coastal provinces clearly receive more FDI than interior provinces. For example, Broadman 
and Sun (1997), Chunlai Chen (1997d) and Coughlin and Segev (2000) just include a dummy 
variable for coastal provinces to capture the advantages of being on the coast line of 12 
provinces, or Cheng and Kwan (2000) uses dummy variable for provinces with SEZs and/or 
ETDZs. All results, of course, show that coastal provinces or provinces with SEZs/ETDZs 
attract much more FDI than others. My approach in this thesis is to use tax information in 
industrial parks to examine local incentives offered to foreign investors. 
However, analysing Table 1 we can clearly see that the number of FDI firms (both from 
NON-HMT and HMT13) and stock of FDI in coastal provinces are much larger than those in 
interior provinces. One of the interesting things is while in coastal provinces the mean of the 
number of NON-HMT firms is much smaller than the mean of the number of HMT firms, it 
is opposite in interior provinces. This raises a question whether NON-HMT investors behave 
differently from HMT counterparts across China, or across China coastal regions and interior 
regions14. 
To sum up, though my first research question is nothing new compared to those in literature 
review, I attempt to examine whether there is any change when we have more updated data. 
Regarding my second research question, I try to discover the differences between the two 
groups of investors from NON-HMT countries and from HMT, which has been ignored so far 
                                                    
13
 In my thesis, I divide foreign invested firms in China into two groups: the first group includes foreign 
invested firms from Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) and the rest is NON-HMT group. 
14
 I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the ideas raised in Hu, A.G. and R.Owen, “Gravity at 
Home and Abroad: Regional Distribution of FDI in China”, National University of Singapore, 2007, Mimeo. 
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in literature. In addition, I also hope to specify the change(s), if any, in the preferences of 
foreign investors when they move into interior provinces. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Coastal Interior 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Obs. Mean Std.Dev Obs. 
N of FDI firms 3219 3157 165 249 228 255 
N of NON-HMT 
firms 
1119 645 121 121 116 187 
N of HMT firms 1548 2000 121 117 124 187 
FDI stock 15450.25 25522.99 253 1403.48 2240.9 392 
GDP per capita 6621 5645 220 2343 1288 340 
Wage 9640 9149 253 6876 5733 391 
Capital/Labour 35537 41254 220 15039 12961 340 
Infrastructure 0.489 0.292 253 0.232 0.191 391 
Human capital 477 113 253 482 127 391 
Tax rate 0.049 0.021 110 0.051 0.018 147 
Source: author’s calculation based on various issues of China Statistical Yearbook 
Note: 
- FDI stock: million USD 
- GDP per capita, wage and capital/labour: Yuan 
- Infrastructure: kilometre/squared kilometre 
- Human capital: number of high school students/10,000 population 
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Chapter III: First Differenced Generalised Methods of Moment Model 
I intentionally use two empirical models in my thesis, the first one is first-differenced 
Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM) and the second one is Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation (QMLE). The first model is used to capture the dynamic process of 
FDI, or self-reinforcing FDI effects, in China. The second model is used to identify the 
determinants of location choice underlying FDI equilibrium stock.  
3.1 First-differenced Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM) model 
I apply Chow’s (1967) partial adjustment model to analyse the Chinese FDI data from 1985 
to 2007. Let Yit be the stock of FDI in region i at time t and Yit* the corresponding 
equilibrium or desired stock. We focus on capital stock as the profitability of investment 
depends on the marginal return to capital, which is a decreasing function of the capital stock. 
We assume that the flow of investment serves to adjust Yit towards Yit* according to the 
following process: 
d lnYit/dt = α(lnYit* - lnYit), 0< α <1                                               (1.1) 
Equation (1.1) says that the percentage change of the FDI stock is proportional to the 
difference between lnYit* and lnYit. We have d lnYit = dYit/Yit , so (1.1) can be rewritten as: 
dYit/dt = αYit(lnYit* - lnYit), 0< α <1                                                      (1.2) 
Equation (1.2) says that if the gap between Yit and Yit* is hold constant, the rate of change of 
FDI stock is proportional to the existing stock. The term Yit on the right hand side of (1.2) 
represents a self-reinforcing or “positive feedback” effect. This effect is consistent with 
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agglomeration effect, which means that FDI attracts further FDI as emphasized in literature 
review. 
In this partial equilibrium model, Yit is taken to affect its own future value, not Yit*. However, 
the term (lnYit* - lnYit) implies that the self-reinforcing effect of Yit will diminish when the 
actual stock approaches the desired stock, which captures a process of gradual adjustment 
toward desired stock. Therefore, the positive feedback effect and gradual adjustment in our 
model will interact to determine the actual path of adjustment. As they both point in the same 
direction through a product term, we cannot decompose their individual contribution to the 
actual investment flow. 
Conditional on a particular level of the equilibrium stock (Yit* = Yi* for all t), equation (1.1) 
can be solved as a differential equation: 
Yit = exp(lnYt* - exp(-αt))                                                                      (1.3) 
Equation (1.3) describes the natural growth of the FDI stock which would have prevailed had 
there been no change in factors that shift the desired stock. Equation (1.1) therefore includes 
two elements that account for the accumulation of FDI. First, the self-reinforcement effect 
and the adjustment effect drive the FDI stock towards a desired level. Second, the equilibrium 
level itself shifts as a result of changes in the environment. 
In empirical applications, equation (1.1) is replaced by the discrete version: 
yit – yit-1 = α(yit* - yit-1)                                                                (1.4) 
where lower case letters stand for logarithmic values. 
After collecting terms we have: yit = (1 - α)yit-1 + αyit*                                                       (1.5) 
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As 0 < α < 1, the adjustment process in equation (1.5) will be stable (non-explosive and non-
fluctuating)15.  
To estimate equation (1.5), we need to specify the determinants of yit*. On the basis of 
existing literature on the location choice of FDI decision, both theoretical and empirical, we 
can postulate that yit* is a function of region i’s regional GDP per capita, human capital, wage 
rate, infrastructure, capital-labour ratio and tax policies. Regional GDP per head measures the 
power of market demand of a province and higher regional GDP per head will help to attract 
foreign invested firms with an aim to serve the local needs. As a large share of FDI in China 
has been in manufacturing with labour intensive nature, we may predict that cheap labour 
cost is an important determinant for the decision of location choice. In my thesis, I use 
average annual wage16 in each province to capture the effect of cheap labour cost. The next 
variable is the human capital and I use the ratio of the number of high school students to total 
population in a province as a proxy. The last variable for comparative advantage is 
infrastructure and I only use the sum of total lengths of highway and railroad divided by the 
regional land area. Some papers include waterway and sea ports in the calculation, but I 
would not follow suit as adding waterway and seaports will be biased in favour of coastal 
provinces. 
                                                    
15
 The solution in general form for equation (1.5) is yit = yi0(1-α)t + yit* where yi0 is the initial value of yit. If 
α>1then yi0(1-α)t will fluctuate (negative and positive) when t goes to infinitive; hence the adjustment process of 
yit towards yit* will be fluctuating. If α<0, then yi0(1-α)t will go to infinitive when t goes to infinitive; hence yit 
will explode. The cases when α equals 0 or 1 are obvious: we cannot have an adjustment process in these two 
cases. Then the assumption 0<α<1 is to ensure yit converges to yit* in a smooth process. 
16Average annual wage refers to the average wage in money terms per person in a certain year for staff and 
workers in enterprises, institutions, and government agencies, which reflects the general level of wage income in 
that year and is calculated as follows: average annual wage equals total wage bill of all workers and staff in a 
certain year over average number of workers and staff in that year. (Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008). 
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The capital-labour ratio positively correlates with the degree of industrialization of the 
province. It is easier for foreign invested firms to form linkages when the degree of 
industrialization is greater. On the other hand, the capital-labour ratio can be a proxy for 
manufacturing density, and as it is argued in Coughlin et al. (1991) this variable can help to 
examine the agglomeration effects as well. The calculation for this ratio is the total value of 
capital assets in each province over its total labour force17. 
As stated earlier, local governments in China compete in FDI tournament by offering lower 
tax rates and cheaper land-use right, especially in SEZs and ETDZs18, because the amount of 
FDI inflows into a region will be used to evaluate the performance of local officials. The 
magnitude of the local governments’ attempt to attract FDI is measured by the tax rate that an 
average foreign invested firm expect to pay in the technology parks. However, in my model I 
use the information on the tax revenue of these parks and their total industrial output to 
calculate the proxy for tax incentives. The ratio of the two variables can help us capture the 
level at which local authorities are willing to give up tax revenue in exchange for FDI. The 
reason I choose this proxy is though the announced official tax rates are basically the same 
across SEZs and ETDZs, local authorities may offer “implicit” extra benefits to foreign 
investors in their actual enforcement. Hence, I predict this proxy can have more explanatory 
power than the tax rates themselves. 
                                                    
17
 One may also argue that capital-labour ratio can possibly be correlated with wage as higher capital-labour 
ratio means higher labour productivity, thus higher wage. However, this ratio will be controlled in the regression 
to deal with the correlation issue. 
18
 Statutory enterprise income tax rate is 33%, but in SEZs and ETDZs this rate is only 15%. Coastal cities and 
provincially established zones can lower the rate to 24%. In addition, enterprises that export at least 70% of the 




So the equilibrium stock can be expressed as: 
y*it = pi’xit + λi + γt + εit                                                     (1.6) 
where pi is a vector of parameters; λi and γt are unobserved region-specific and time-specific 
effects respectively; εit is a random disturbance. Substituting (1.6) into (1.5) we have a 
dynamic panel regression for empirical implementation: 
yit = (1-α) yit-1 + β’xit + uit i=1,2,..,N and t=2,3,...,T                          (1.7) 
where β = αpi, uit = αλi + αγt + αεit 
Equation (1.7) is a dynamic panel data regression with a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side. It is important to ascertain the serial property of the disturbances in the 
context of a dynamic panel data. Moreover, the problem of reverse causality needs to be 
addressed by dealing with the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables arising from 
the feedback effects of FDI. 
The above-mentioned issues can be solved under first-differenced Generalised Methods of 
Moment (GMM) framework19. The approach starts with the first-differenced version of 
equation (1.7): 
∆yit = (1-α)∆yit-1 + β’∆xit + ∆uit  i=1,2,...,N ; t=3,4,...,T                                  (1.8) 
in which the region-specific effects are eliminated through differencing. 
                                                    
19
 Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) 
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Under the assumption of serial uncorrelated level residuals, values of y lagged for two 
periods or more will be qualified as instruments in the first-differenced system, implying the 
following moment conditions: 
E(yit-s∆uit) = 0  t=3,4,...,T and s ≥ 2                                              (1.9) 
But GMM estimation based on equation (1.9) alone can be highly inefficient. In most cases, it 
is necessary to make use of the explanatory variables as additional instruments though this 
may lead to critical issue of endogeneity due to reverse causality. For strict exogenous 
explanatory variables, both past and future ∆x are valid instruments: 
E(∆xit-s∆uit) = 0 t=3,4,....,T and all s                                                    (1.10) 
However, using equation (1.10) with s<2 will lead to inconsistent estimates if reverse 
causality exists. To allow for this possibility, we may assume x to be weakly exogenous (i.e. 
E(xisαεit)=0 for s<t) and then we have the following subset of equation (1.10): 
E(∆xit-s∆uit) = 0 t=3,4,....,T and all s>2                                                  (1.11) 
Equations from (1.8) to (1.11) imply a set of linear moment conditions to which the standard 
GMM methodology applies. The consistency of GMM estimators depends on the validity of 
these moment conditions. We use the Sargan test to check the validity of these moment 
conditions. The null hypothesis of no misspecification is rejected if the minimized GMM 
criterion function registers a large value compared with a chi-squared distribution (with the 
degree of freedom equal to the difference between the number of moment conditions and 
number of parameters). We can also conduct the Sargan difference test to evaluate the 
validity of extra moment conditions in a nested case. Strict exogeneity implies extra moments 
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over that of weak exogeneity. If these extra moment conditions are rejected by the Sargan-
difference test, the stronger assumption of strict exogeneity might be irrelevant. 
The serial correlation property of the level residuals can be checked by Arellano-Bond m1 and 
m2 statistics. If the level residuals were indeed serially uncorrelated, the first-differenced 
residuals in equation (1.8) would follow a MA(1) process, implying that autocorrelations of  
the first-order are non zero but the second or higher order are zero. The Arellano-Bond m1 
and m2 statistics test the null hypotheses of zero first-order and second-order autocorrelation 
respectively. An insignificant m1 and/or significant m2 will tell us the likely presence of 
invalid moment conditions due to serial correlation in the level residuals. 
3.2 Data 
All provincial data are collected from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook and the 
latest one is China Statistical Yearbook 2008. I can collect the data for the number of foreign 
invested firms from 1993 to 2007, but the data for the number of foreign invested firms in 
NON-HMT and HMT subcategories are available from 1993-2003 only. The tax information 
is obtained from MOST (2001). Missing information on tax revenue from 2001 to 2007 is a 
limitation in my thesis. However, this is all I can find within my utmost effort. 
Three provinces are excluded in my thesis for different reasons. Tibet is excluded because 
there is so little FDI in this region that it is not worth examining. Hainan was divided from 
Guangdong in 1988 and most of the data for Hainan are about 1% of those for Guangdong, 
which does not make any difference in our analysis. On contrary, though Chongqing was 
separated from Sichuan in 1997, I still sum up the data of these two regions and treat 
Chongqing as part of Sichuan for consistency in the database. The reason is Chongqing 
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accounts for about 30% of total amount of FDI stock and combined number of foreign 
invested firms in Sichuan and Chongqing as a single administrative unit. 
3.3 Regression results 
The results of estimation by GMM are reported in Table 2. The null hypothesis in the Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions is rejected because of the large value of chi-squared of 
247.23. Therefore, there is no misspecification and the moment conditions are valid, implying 
that GMM estimators are consistent. Arrellano-Bond m1 and m2 statistics are significant and 
insignificant respectively, which tells us that there is likely no presence of invalid moment 
conditions due to serial correlation in the level residuals. Being aware that GMM estimation 
based on equation (1.9) alone might be unstable, I run the regression with the fixed effects 
model (the Hausman test with large chi-squared of 55.01 rejects the null hypothesis in favour 
of the random effects model) for the same data and the results are almost similar in terms of 
signs and significant levels. Therefore, the GMM estimation in Table 2 can be said to be 
reliable. 
Results in Table 2 can confirm that there exist self-reinforcing effects of FDI stock in China. 
The current FDI stock is positively associated with past FDI stock at high significant level, 
which is consistent with findings in many other papers like Cheng and Kwan (2000). The 
coefficient of 0.626 for logarithmic value of FDI stock implies that if FDI stock in a certain 
region increases by 10%, the FDI stock in the next period of this region will be possibly 6.26 
percentage points higher.  However, the capital-labour ratio has shown unexpected sign at 
significant level of 90% with the coefficient of -0.1220. Wage and GDP per capita variables 
                                                    
20
 More explanations will be given in the next chapter. 
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have expected signs with high level of significance; however, the magnitude of GDP per 
capita variable is 2.355, almost four times higher than that of wage variable. Among all 
variables, the coefficient of GDP per capita is the highest and it shows that a 1% increase in 
GDP figure of a province may lead to an impressive increase of 2.355 percentage points of 
FDI stock of that province in the next period. High wage rate will have a negative impact on 
FDI stock with a 1% increase in wage rate probably resulting in a slight decrease of over half 
a percentage point of FDI stock in the next period. The results for infrastructure and tax are 
statistically insignificant, but the sign for infrastructure is negative, which is opposite from 
our expectation. Though the result for tax is negative as expected, its coefficient of -0.006 is 
too small to have any practical impacts.  Most surprisingly, human capital has an opposite 
sign with high significant level. If the logarithmic value of the ratio of high school students in 
a province is 1% higher, its FDI stock is predicted to be 1.346 percentage points lower in the 
next period. I have actually tried two other ratios of the total number of primary and college 
students over total population in the regression. The results are insignificant and positive as 
expected for primary school enrolments, but the ratio for college students produces similar 
results as the results for the ratio of high school students. This issue, together with others, will 
be discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
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Table 2: Determinants of FDI location – GMM 
 GMM GMM FIXED 
Log(FDI stock) 0.599*** 0.626*** 0.679*** 
 (0.0454) (0.0429) (0.0442) 
Log(wage) -0.659*** -0.528*** -0.223** 
 (0.157) (0.134) (0.109) 
Log(GDP per head) 2.356*** 2.355*** 1.658*** 
 (0.257) (0.232) (0.235) 
Log(Human_Highschool) -1.238*** -1.346*** -0.923*** 
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.162) 
Log(Infrastructure) -0.153 -0.117 -0.0305 
 (0.16) (0.158) (0.146) 
Log(Tax) -0.018 -0.00589 0.00989 
 (0.0312) (0.0305) (0.0313) 
Log(capital-labour) -0.132** -0.120* -0.0765 
 (0.0644) (0.0634) (0.0691) 
Log(Human_Primary) 0.126   
 (0.123)   
Log(Human_University) -0.207*   
 (0.122)   
Standard errors are in bracket. 
*-significant at 90% level; **-significant at 95% level; ***-significant at 99% level. 
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Chapter IV: Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation Model 
4.1 Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) model 
As stated earlier, the first-differenced GMM model is used to mainly capture the dynamic 
process of FDI, or self-reinforcing FDI effects. The regression results for human capital, 
infrastructure, tax and capital-labour ratio variables are somehow unexpected or 
unexplainable. Therefore, I use Poisson QMLE model to identify the determinants of location 
choice underlying FDI equilibrium stock. The model is based on three hypothesis of FDI 
location: agglomeration effect, regional comparative advantage and location tournament. I 
model FDI as the number of foreign invested firms21 in a province and we can see that the 
number of foreign invested firms registered each year can be treated as a count variable with 
the same length of observation time. As the normal distribution for count data is the Poisson 
distribution, I can have a basic model formulation in which the mean of the number of 
foreign invested firms is determined by: 
E(FDIit) = exp (βiXit-1)                                                    (2.1) 
Take log for both sides we have: 
Log(E(FDIit)) = βiXit-1                                                   (2.2) 
where dependent variable E(FDIit) is the expected value for the number of registered foreign 
invested firms and Xit-1 consists of three groups of determinants of FDI: agglomeration, 
comparative advantage and location tournament. The variables for comparative advantage 
and location tournament are the same as those in GMM model. One of the two variables to 
                                                    
21
 I follow Arthur (1990) which captures agglomeration economies through the number of firms in a location. 
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test agglomeration effects is the log of accumulated FDI in a region. The larger existing stock 
of FDI in a province up to the last period, the more attractive a province it is in the eyes of 
future foreign investors. From our functional form we can find a proportional relationship 
between the number of foreign invested firms in a province and its existing stock of FDI 
(%∆E(FDIit) ~ (100βi)∆Xit-1). Similar to what I have done in GMM model, the other variable 
to capture agglomeration effects is the capital-labour ratio in each region. 
As equation (2.1) is nonlinear in its parameters, we cannot use linear regression methods. We 
may use nonlinear least squares, but this method does not exploit the fact that all standard 
count data distributions exhibit heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we will rely on maximum 
likelihood and the important related method of quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. 
Though Poisson distribution has a very nice robustness property (βj are consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimators whether or not the Poisson distribution holds), Poisson 
MLE analysis is often too restrictive with the Poisson variance assumption Var(y x ) = 
E(y x ). This assumption is usually violated and leads to smaller, incorrect standard errors. 
Therefore, when we do not assume the Poisson distribution is entirely correct, we use Poisson 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) analysis in our regression to get robust 
standard errors. 
4.2 Regression results and discussion 
4.2.1 Agglomeration, comparative advantage or policy? 
The results of estimation by Poisson QMLE method with robust standard errors are reported 
in Table 3 and Table 4. In Table 3, in addition to the columns showing regression results for 
two separate groups of foreign invested firms (HMT and NON-HMT) and a column for 
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results without tax variable, I include a column of GMM estimation results to compare the 
two models22. Table 4 presents the estimation results for two groups of foreign invested firms 
in coastal provinces and inland provinces.  
As we can see in Table 3, while the coefficients of GDP per capita are positive in both 
models, it is statistically insignificant in Poisson QMLE model and highly significant in the 
other. Moreover, the coefficients of GDP per capita also change dramatically from 2.355 in 
GMM model to only 0.56 in Poisson model. The case of tax variable is opposite; it is 
statistically significant in Poisson QMLE model but insignificant in GMM model, though 
both produce expected negative sign. As I mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, the 
magnitude of tax variable in GMM model was too small to have any practical impacts. 
However, under the Poisson model, tax variable turns out to be a strong determinant with the 
coefficient of -3.724, which means a decrease of 1% in the ratio between tax revenue and 
industrial output of industrial parks in a province might be associated with a 3.724 % increase 
in the logarithmic value of the average number of FIEs in the province. 
Both models can confirm agglomeration effects in which previous FDI stock can positively 
affect future FDI inflows in a region, though the coefficient in GMM model is slightly larger 
(0.626 compared to 0.42). Capital-labour ratio has unexpected sign but it is insignificant in 
Poisson estimation, which means we cannot confirm the existence of upward or downward 
linkages among firms, both foreign and local, in China. It is worth noted that the capital-
labour ratio is calculated with the total value of capital assets in each Chinese province over 
                                                    
22
 As the dependent variable is the mean of the foreign invested firms in year t, there might be fixed locational 
effects which are not taken into account in the Poisson QMLE regression. Hence comparing Poisson QMLE 
regression results with those from GMM fixed effects model can possibly help to figure out whether fixed 
locational effects, if any, in Poison QMLE model may significantly divert the findings. 
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its total labour force, therefore I cannot say anything about upward or downward linkages 
among foreign investors themselves. In GMM estimation, capital-labour ratio is statistically 
significant with the coefficient of -0.12, which is opposite from expectation in agglomeration 
theories. This is also against findings in Henderson (1986) which indicates that more dense 
manufacturing activities will improve productivity of resources in any industry and hence 
more investors will be attracted. One possible explanation is foreign investors are against the 
incentives to set up linkages with local manufacturers, instead they wish to congregate in 
special locations designated for foreign investors only. Another surprising finding is that the 
negative impact of human capital with high level of significance against FDI inflows can be 
found in both models. However, the absolute value of the coefficient in the Poisson model is 
much smaller (-0.002 compared to -1.346). This reminds me of a result in Cheng and Kwan 
(2000) in which the authors found no significant relationship between education and FDI. 
Similar to what I have done in GMM model, I also tried to use the ratios between the total 
number of primary students and college graduates over the total provincial population 
separately in the regression, but similar results or insignificant results were reported. This is 
rather counter intuitive as when wage rate is controlled, higher level of education means 
higher labour quality and productivity, which possibly attracts more foreign investors. 
Infrastructure is found to be statistically insignificant in both models, similar to the finding in 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) though the coefficient in Poisson model is positive as expected 
whereas it is negative in GMM model. The role of wage rate in two the models is almost the 
same in terms of coefficient and significant level, which means the two models can confirm 
the negative relationship between wage rate and FDI inflows in China. 
Tax incentives can strongly affect FDI location choice of foreign investors. The coefficient of 
tax variable in Poisson model shows a significant negative effect on FDI inflows, which 
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means higher tax revenue over total industrial outputs in technology parks may discourage 
foreign investors. Moreover, the presence of tax variable in the Poisson model can tell us 
something interesting. As we can see in Table 3, adding tax variable leads to dramatic change 
in the significant level of FDI stock and GDP per capita variables. The coefficient of FDI 
stock becoming statistically significant when we include tax variable can be interpreted that 
self-reinforcing effects of FDI would exist only when the local government had provided 
greater tax incentive. This may also mean that tax incentive magnify the role of 
agglomeration economies, while the finding in Head and Ries (1996) is opposite: 
agglomeration effects magnify the role of local incentives. Similarly, tax incentive may 
outweigh the benefits of the strong local market demand when adding tax variable in the 
regression leads to a change from statistically significant level to statistically insignificant 
level of GDP per capita variable. Moreover, the coefficient of GDP per capita variable when 
adding tax incentive is nearly four times lower than that if tax incentive is excluded in the 
regression. With the absence of tax incentive, GDP per capita is the most influential 
determinant with the largest magnitude of 1.9, but then it turns out to be insignificant with a 
small coefficient of 0.56 when tax incentive is included in the regression. Meanwhile, 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) implies that developing countries which are doing well in offering 
comparative advantages do not need location tournaments to attract U.S multinationals. 
In short, the results I have obtained in both models can confirm the self-reinforcing effects of 
FDI and location tournaments. Another proxy for agglomeration economies, i.e. capital-
labour ratio, shows an opposite finding in comparison with theoretical and empirical studies, 
but there may exist a valid reason for this fact. For comparative advantage, wage rate and 
GDP per capita can produce expected signs with statistical significance, while infrastructure 
and human capital variables cannot. Moreover, the unexpected finding on human capital is 
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rather counter intuitive and it is hard to understand what lies behind this result. Though it is 
really hard to conclude the dominance between agglomeration effects and comparative 
advantage, we can assert that tax incentive, which is a proxy for local government’s effort to 
attract FDI, has a very strong impact on the location choice of foreign investors. 
4.2.2 Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) vs. NON-HMT investment 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction section, FDI from Hongkong, Macau, Taiwan 
(HMT) and tax havens accounted for quite a large share of total FDI in China before 1990. 
However, this share has been declining steadily when investment from developed countries 
such as Japan, the U.S, EU and South Korea makes up most of the rest of China’s FDI since 
early 1990s. Hongkong alone accounted for 60.9% of FDI stock in China from 1985 to 1990, 
but this share dropped sharply to 31.9% in the period from 2001 to 2006. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the behaviours of firms from these two separate 
groups, i.e. NON-HMT and HMT groups. I investigate the determinants of FDI for the two 
groups of firms in Table 3 and Table 4 and some differences can be highlighted. While the 
results of Poisson QMLE regression for all foreign invested firms show that tax policy is an 
important determinant for location choice, it turns out to be insignificant for NON-HMT 
firms; whereas it is highly significant and twice larger (in absolute value) for HMT firms. 
HMT investment can be said to be strongly responsive to tax policy, but NON-HMT 
investors do not take tax issues as seriously as other determinants23. In addition, the 
magnitude of the coefficient for agglomeration economies reduces by almost 50% (from 
0.575 to 0.309) and the level of significance is also much worse when we compare the NON-
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HMT group with the HMT group (see Table 3). This may imply that while investors from 
NON-HMT countries tend to prefer regions with higher FDI stock level, HMT investment 
shows no interest in locating in regions with high FDI density. HMT investments seem to 
prefer enjoying favourable tax policy instead. Insights of this issue will be discussed in more 
depth when I look into the behaviours of HMT investors in coastal regions in the next part. 
Other two variables (wage and human capital) can also help us distinguish the two different 
mechanisms of FDI location choice between the two groups. While HMT investors tend to 
prefer regions with low-skilled workers and lower wages, NON-HMT investors pay much 
less attention to these factors. As we can see in Table 3, human capital is statistically 
insignificant for NON-HMT firms, whereas it is highly significant for HMT enterprises. 
However, the negative value of the coefficient of human capital variable is counter intuitive 
as discussed earlier and I cannot find any valid explanation for this fact. For the wage rate, 
though the coefficients have the same sign, the magnitude for HMT investment is much 
stronger than that for NON-HMT investment (-0.894 compared with -0.356). Furthermore, 
the result for HMT investment is statistically significant at 99% level while it is insignificant 
for NON-HMT investment. The fact that lower wage rate can attract more HMT firms, but 
not NON-HMT firms, might result from the observation that HMT investors focus more on 
labour-intensive industries. 
I can draw moderate contrast in the behaviour of NON-HMT and HMT investors in China. 
Tax incentive is more effective in attracting HMT investment than NON-HMT investment. 
Moreover, HMT investors seem to prefer regions with low labour cost and low-skilled 
workers, while NON-HMT investors pay much less attention to these determinants. Finally, 
agglomeration effects are more important to NON-HMT investments. 
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4.2.3 Coast vs. Interior 
As we can see in regional distribution figure, FDI has been diffusing dramatically among 
coastal regions with some provinces like Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shandong, Beijing etc. catching 
up with Guangdong in attracting FDI. However, inland regions still remain poor performers 
and the FDI distribution among these regions shows really little change. 
I estimate the equation for Poisson QMLE model for coastal provinces and interior provinces, 
and then for each of the two groups in two areas24. The results in Table 4 can present some 
notable differences in driving forces of FDI location between the two areas. 
Foreign investors who established ventures in China inland provinces tend to strongly favour 
agglomeration effects and comparative advantage, while tax has no impact on their decisions. 
They prefer inland provinces with low capital-labour ratio, low wage and low education 
level. The fact that foreign investors move to regions with low capital-labour ratio might hint 
their attempt to take first-mover advantages in less-developed regions (as explained earlier, 
the low capital-labour ratio means poor degree of industrialization of a region). However, 
they still want to be located near each other and the reason might be that they can benefit 
from previous neighbouring foreign investors in terms of information and experience sharing. 
On the other hand, investors in coastal provinces are driven by tax incentives and 
agglomeration economies. However, dividing investors in coastal regions into two groups 
may reveal quite interesting issues. Though HMT investors in coastal provinces have been 
highly responsive to tax rates, it seems they do not care about agglomeration effects. This is 
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 In my thesis, the two words “province” and “region” are inter-changeable, while the word “area” refers to a 
group of all provinces whether on the coast or inland.   
44 
 
rather strange at a first glance as we predict one of the main reasons for HMT investment to 
flood coastal regions is the kind of agglomeration economies generated by the linkages 
between local and foreign firms sharing the same culture and coastal borders. But on second 
thoughts, it might be explained by the fact that investors from HMT have so close links to 
China’s coastal provinces (especially southern coastal provinces) that they feel quite 
confident to navigate their business among local firms and the only important thing they need 
to care is tax incentive. This explanation could be confirmed when we see that agglomeration 
effects turn out to be quite important and significant to HMT investors when they move 
inland, while tax incentive is no longer their concern. In contrast, it is NON-HMT investors 
in coastal provinces who take into account agglomeration effects, but not tax incentive. I 
interpret this result as evidence that these NON-HMT investors rely on vertical linkages to 
the upstream and downstream industries within themselves, and another reason is they indeed 
need to learn good lessons of how to operate efficiently in a uniquely transitional economy 
like China from other foreign investors. Therefore, tax incentive plays much less an 
important role than agglomeration effects from NON-HMT investors’ perspectives. 
To sum up, foreign investors in China behave differently both between two groups and two 
areas. While investors in interior regions pay attention to agglomeration effects and 
comparative advantage, investors in coastal regions take into consideration tax incentive and 
agglomeration effects. However, HMT investors in coastal regions focus mainly on tax; 
whereas NON-HMT investors in coastal provinces prefer agglomeration effects. 
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Table 3: Determinants of FDI location- Poisson QMLE compared with GMM 
    Poisson  
 GMM Poisson NON-HMT HMT W/o tax 
Log(FDI stock) 0.626*** 0.420** 0.575*** 0.309 0.112 
 (0.0429) (0.195) (0.171) (0.205) (0.114) 
Log( GDP/capita) 2.355*** 0.56 -0.847 1.652 1.904*** 
 (0.232) (1.243) (1.226) (1.218) (0.708) 
Log(wage) -0.528*** -0.649*** -0.356 -0.894*** -0.638*** 
 (0.134) (0.229) (0.273) (0.227) (0.241) 
Infrastructure -0.117 0.541 0.195 0.841 0.531 
 (0.158) (0.796) (0.504) (0.992) (0.535) 
Human_Highschool -1.346*** -0.00202* -0.00118 -0.00289** -0.00224*** 
 (0.162) (0.00107) (0.00098) (0.00129) (0.00081) 
Tax -0.00589 -3.724** -2.29 -4.517***  
 (0.0305) (1.7) (2.339) (1.578)  
Log(Capital/Labour) -0.120* (-0.303) (-0.222) (-0.364) (-0.406*) 
 (0.0634) (0.314) (0.392) (0.268) (0.241) 
Robust standard errors are in bracket. 
*-significant at 90% level; **-significant at 95% level; ***-significant at 99% level. 
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Table 4: FDI location: Coast vs. Interior 
Coast Interior 
 All NON-HMT HMT All NON-HMT HMT 
Log(FDI stock) 0.533* 0.744** 0.369 0.894*** 0.897*** 0.890*** 
 (0.291) (0.296) (0.276) (0.171) (0.189) (0.182) 
Log(capital/labour) -0.711 -0.729 -0.654 -0.311*** -0.276*** -0.355** 
 (0.833) (0.982) (0.738) (0.116) (0.0987) (0.161) 
Log(GDP/head) 0.459 -1.458 2.028 0.601 0.543 0.55 
 (1.843) (1.791) (1.789) (1.305) (1.481) (1.289) 
Log(wage) -0.0499 0.247 -0.326 -1.645*** -1.712*** -1.514*** 
 (0.478) (0.512) (0.506) (0.473) (0.419) (0.585) 
Infrastructure 0.413 -0.212 0.755 -1.542 -1.413 -1.659 
 (0.624) (0.478) (0.61) (2.521) (3.13) (1.994) 
Human_Highschool -0.00212 -0.00039 -0.00373** -0.00438** -0.00459** -0.00432** 
 (0.0015) (0.00134) (0.00153) (0.00189) (0.00216) (0.00181) 
Tax -3.040* -1.011 -4.306*** -0.145 0.971 -1.499 
 (1.81) (2.741) (1.527) (3.185) (3.104) (4.212) 
       
       
Robust standard errors are in bracket. 
*-significant at 90% level; **-significant at 95% level; ***-significant at 99% level. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
The spatial distribution of FDI across Chinese provinces has been changing in the past 20 
years. In particular, FDI has been diffusing fast among coastal provinces with more even 
distribution. However, the gap between the coast and interior in receiving FDI has been 
widening. In my thesis, I aim to investigate the determinants of the spatial distribution of FDI 
and its evolution in China in 1990s and early 2000s, together with the examination of NON-
HMT and HMT investors’ behaviours. 
I hypothesize that the interaction of the three driving forces (agglomeration economies, 
comparative advantage and location tournament) has determined the geographical 
distribution of FDI inflows in China. Agglomeration economies imply a self-reinforcing 
process in which regions started with higher level of FDI stock continues to receive bigger 
share of FDI inflows, while regions with lower level of FDI stock hardly see any 
improvement in attracting FDI. On the other hand, comparative advantage may turn foreign 
investors’ attention to regions offering lower operation cost and better infrastructure. 
However, the presence of agglomeration externalities may prevent firms to move to new, 
lower cost sites. By offering preferential policy incentives, local governments can lessen such 
inertia and motivate foreign firms to relocate in the designed destinations. 
Using data on Chinese provincial FDI and other categories plus the information on the tax 
revenue in the technology parks within a province, I estimate two FDI location equations in 
two different models. The results in both models are almost similar and confirm the self-
reinforcing effects of FDI in China. It is paradoxical when human capital turns out to be a 
significantly negative determinant of FDI in both models. For the case of capital-labour ratio, 
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it might be interpreted that foreign investors are against linkages with local manufacturers; 
instead, they wish to congregate in their designated zones.  Though I cannot conclude 
whether agglomeration economies play a more important role than comparative advantage or 
vice versa, I find that tax policy, a proxy for location tournament, indeed has a very strong 
impact on the location choice of foreign investors in China. 
There are also interesting differences between NON-HMT investors and HMT investors 
concerning their location choice. There is evidence that NON-HMT investors tend to locate 
in provinces with larger existing presence of FDI, both on coastal line and inland, while tax 
policy does not seem to play any role. On contrary, HMT firms prefer regions with low 
labour cost and low tax rates, while agglomeration has limited apparent effects on their 
location choice decisions. 
The preferences of NON-HMT and HMT investors change when they move their investment 
into interior regions. Tax incentives seem to be an important determinant for HMT investors 
across China, but when we examine this group of investors in interior regions alone they do 
not respond to tax policy at all. Agglomeration effect for HMT investors is opposite, it is 
insignificant when they invest in coastal regions, but then turns out to be highly significant 
for HMT investors in interior regions. Both NON-HMT and HMT investors take into account 
the effects of wage and capital labour ratio only when they invest into inland provinces. 
Updating the data does not change any results in the regression. I had run the regression with 
data till 2004, and then when I redid it later with updated data till 2007 the results were 




I am also fully aware that missing information on tax revenue is a drawback in my thesis. 
However, I have struggled in digging the data with my utmost efforts but in vain. The results 
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